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WINNER, BEST APPELLATE BRIEF IN THE 2021 NATIVE 
AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION MOOT COURT 
COMPETITION* 
Eric Rolston** & Polina Noskova*** 
 
Questions Presented 
I. Whether the Treaty with the Wendat abrogated the Treaty of Wauseon 
and/or the Maumee Allotment Act of 1908 diminished the Maumee 
Reservation. If so, whether the Wendat Allotment Act (1892) also 
diminished the Wendat Reservation or if the Topanga Cession is outside of 
Indian Country. 
II. Assuming the Topanga Cession is still in Indian Country, whether 
either the doctrine of Indian preemption or infringement prevent the State 
of New Dakota from collecting its Transaction Privilege Tax against a 
Wendat tribal corporation. 
Statement of the Case 
I. Statement of the Facts 
This case is about determining whether Congress made the requisite 
statement to diminish the Maumee or Wendat reservations, and whether it is 
proper for a state to levy a tax on a tribal corporation in Indian Country 
when the tax interferes with tribal and federal interests.  
The Wendat Band (hereinafter the “Band” or “Wendat Band”) is an 
Indian tribe located in the State of New Dakota. The Band dates its rights to 
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the 1859 Treaty with the Wendat, reserving land east of the Wapakoneta 
River to the tribe. See Treaty with the Wendat, March 26, 1859, 35 Stat. 
7749, R. at 5. The Band intends to construct a combination residential-
commercial development (hereinafter the “Development”) on a parcel of 
land in the western portion of its Reservation. Id. at 7. The Development 
would include public housing units for low-income tribal members, a 
nursing care facility for elders, a tribal cultural center, and a tribal museum. 
Id. The housing and nursing facilities could not be constructed without 
revenue provided by a shopping complex that would include a grocery store 
offering fresh and traditional foods, as well as a bookstore and pharmacy. 
Id. at 7–8. The Development would support at least 350 jobs and any profits 
would be remitted quarterly to the tribal government as dividend 
distributions. Id. 
The Maumee Indian Tribe (hereinafter the “Maumee”) Reservation 
shares a border with the Wendat Reservation. The 1802 Treaty of Wauseon 
established the Maumee Reservation, reserving land west of the 
Wapakoneta River to the petitioner. Id. at 4; see also Treaty of Wauseon, 
Oct. 4, 1801, 7 Stat. 1404, Id. at 4. The river, referenced in both treaties, 
moved some three miles west in the 1830s, with the area between the 
current and prior river locations referred to as the Topanga Cession. Id. at 5. 
Thus, by the time Congress established the Wendat Reservation in 1859, 
the river already moved, and a plain reading of the treaty would indicate 
Congress intended the Wendat Band to inhabit the Topanga Cession. Id. 
However, since at least 1937, both tribes have maintained they have the 
exclusive right to the lands. Id.  
Other congressional acts have since affected these tribal boundaries. 
Both the Wendat Band and the Maumee were subject to congressional 
allotment acts, which authorized the allotment of lands to tribal members 
and opened up their reservations to non-Indian settlers. Id.; see also Felix 
Cohen, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 1.03 (Nell Jessup 
Newton ed., 2017).  
The Wendat Allotment Act of 1892 preserved the boundaries of the 
Wendat Reservation, while allowing non-Indian settlers to buy plots of land 
and settle on or near the Topanga Cession. See Wendat Allotment Act, Pub. 
L. No. 52-8222, ch. 42 (1892); infra at 19–23. The Maumee Allotment Act 
of 1908 diminished petitioner’s Reservation and ceded any claims they may 
have had remaining over the Topanga Cession back to Wendat Band 
control, per their earlier treaty. Id. at 14; Maumee Allotment Act of 1908, 
Pub. L. No. 60-8107, ch. 818. Both tribes agree that no member of either 
tribe selected an allotment within the Topanga Cession. R. at 5.  
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While the tribes have disputed the ownership of the Topanga Cession for 
over 80 years, there was no need for a definitive answer until recently. R. at 
7.  
New Dakota’s Transaction Privilege Tax (“TPT”) played an important 
part in escalating the dispute between the tribes. R. at 8. The applicable 
statute requires businesses operating within the state to apply for a license, 
4 N.D.C. § 212(1), and remit 3% of proceeds to the state’s general fund, Id. 
at § 212(3). Tribal businesses operating within a tribe’s own reservation on 
land held in trust by the United States are exempt from the statute. Id. at § 
212(4). However, the statute requires Indian businesses operating on 
another tribe’s reservations to remit funds to the state. Id. at § 212(5). The 
state then remits these proceeds to the tribe on whose reservation the 
business operates. Id. Thus, the statute allows for the state to collect taxes 
on businesses even when the income is entirely earned within Indian 
Country from a business entirely owned by Indians. If applied to the 
Development, the TPT would impose additional costs of approximately 
$2.4 million per year (assuming estimated gross sales per year of $80 
million at a 3% tax rate), diminishing proceeds that would otherwise go 
towards the Development, including the housing and nursing facilities, or 
members of the Wendat Band. Id. at 8. 
After the Wendat Band announced the Development, the petitioner 
approached the Band regarding the tax, attempting to divert proceeds from 
the Development to its own tribe. Id. This would happen if the 
Development was located on a Maumee Reservation. Id. at 6–8. The 
Wendat Band replied that the TPT does not apply to the Development 
because it is located on the Wendat Reservation, and under the doctrines of 
Indian preemption and infringement. Id. at 8.  
II. Statement of the Proceedings 
The petitioner filed a complaint in the United States District Court for 
the District of New Dakota asking for a Declaration that any development 
in the Topanga Cession be subject to the TPT because it is located on the 
Maumee Reservation. Id. at 8. The Declaration would result in the tax being 
imposed on the Wendat Band Development and tax proceeds being remitted 
to the petitioner. Id. Alternatively, the petitioner asked for a Declaration 
that the Topanga Cession is not Indian Country at all, which would result in 
the tax on the Development being split between the state and the petitioner. 
Id. The Wendat Band argued that the Development is in Indian Country and 
that New Dakota has no authority to collect the tax because it is either 
preempted by federal law or infringes on the Wendat Band’s sovereignty. 
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Id. at 4. In the alternative, the Wendat Band argued that the Development is 
located on its own Reservation, in which case any tax paid would be 
remitted back to the tribe. Id. The District Court found for the petitioner. Id. 
at 9.  
The Wendat Band appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth 
Circuit which waited to make its ruling until after this Court’s decision in 
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), and then reversed the District 
Court. Id. at 10–11. The Court of Appeals held that the Treaty with the 
Wendat of 1859 clearly abrogated the petitioner’s claim to the Topanga 
Cession and the Wendat Allotment Act did not include sufficient cession 
language to diminish the Wendat Reservation. Id. at 10. Thus, the land 
belongs to the Wendat Band. Id. In addition, the Court of Appeals held that 
“the tax infringes on tribal sovereignty, (Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 
(1959)) and should be subject to Indian preemption under Supreme Court 
precedent (White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 
(1980)).” Id. at 11. The Court of Appeals noted that either doctrine would 
be sufficient to bar the application of the tax, but both are present in this 
case. Id.  
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide two 
issues: (1) whether the Topanga Cession is located in the Maumee 
Reservation, the Wendat Band Reservation, or outside of Indian Country, 
and (2) whether the doctrines of infringement or preemption bar New 
Dakota from levying its tax in Indian Country. Id. at 3. 
Summary of Argument 
The State of New Dakota has no authority to levy its tax on the 
Development. The Development is located on the Wendat Reservation and 
both the doctrines of Indian preemption and infringement bar the 
application of the tax in Indian Country.  
The Maumee Reservation does not include lands located within the 
Topanga Cession. Congress diminished the Maumee Reservation by the 
Treaty with the Wendat of 1859, and if not this treaty, then by the Maumee 
Allotment Act of 1908. Following the diminishment of the Maumee 
Reservation, the Topanga Cession was located completely within the 
Wendat Reservation which remains the case today. 
Congress alone has the power to abrogate Indian treaties or diminish 
reservations. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2462. The first step in analyzing whether 
an Indian reservation was diminished is to examine congressional intent of 
the treaty or statute at issue under the test outlined in McGirt. Id. 
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Congressional intent should be determined using the language of the act, 
and then, only if the language is ambiguous, using extratextual evidence to 
clarify the text. Id.  
Congress abrogated the Treaty of Wauseon by leveraging its 
constitutional power to pass laws in conflict with previous treaties made 
with Indians. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). Congress 
clearly delineated their intention that the Wendat Band inhabit lands east of 
the Wapakoneta River. Treaty of Wauseon, Oct. 4, 1801, 7 Stat. 1404. If the 
Court finds the text of the treaty ambiguous, legislative history confirms 
this conclusion by noting that the Maumee had previously yielded their 
claims to parts of this territory. See Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
5411–12 (1859).  
Congress confirmed this abrogation when passing the Maumee 
Allotment Act of 1908, which ceded the eastern quarter of the Maumee 
Reservation to the United States. Maumee Allotment Act of 1908, Pub. L. 
No. 60-8107, ch. 818. The Maumee Allotment Act uses cession language 
similar to other allotment acts which have been held to diminish tribal 
boundaries. See DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Ct. for Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 
U.S. 425, 449 (1975); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 614–15 
(1977). Similar to the above, if the language of the Act is found to be 
ambiguous, the extratextual evidence also indicates that the land was 
diminished. See 42 Cong. Rec. 2345 (1908); also R. at 7.  
On the other hand, the Wendat Reservation survived allotment because 
the language of the act shows that Congress did not intend to diminish the 
Reservation. Wendat Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 52-8222, ch. 42 (1892). 
There is no mention of cession in the act, and the outline of payments to the 
tribe after land sales are not unconditional. Id. In addition, if the Court finds 
this text ambiguous, the subsequent demographics of the Topanga Cession 
provide extra contextual evidence that that the section of land was merely 
opened up to non-Indian settlers. R. at 7.  
Because the Maumee claim to the Topanga Cession was abrogated, first 
by the Treaty with the Wendat and then by the Maumee Allotment Act, the 
Topanga Cession remains part of the Wendat Reservation. 
Regardless of how the Court decides whether the Topanga Cession is 
located within the Maumee or Wendat Reservation, the Court should find 
New Dakota’s Transaction Privilege Tax invalid as applied in Indian 
Country. This Court has long recognized that state law is generally not 
applicable within Indian Country. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 
561–62 (1832). Two barriers limit the applicability of the state tax to the 
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Development: the doctrines of Indian preemption and infringement. White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142–43 (1980).  
In considering Indian preemption of the TPT, there are two routes the 
Court can take and either approach is sufficient to find the tax preempted. 
First, the Court should follow the approach laid out in Chickasaw Nation, 
where the Court held that when the legal incidence of a tax in Indian 
Country falls on a tribe or tribal members, states are categorically barred 
from applying the tax without congressional authorization. Okla. Tax 
Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 459 (1995). This categorical 
bar applies because Congress has not authorized this tax, and the tax 
ultimately falls on the Wendat Band. Second, if not following the 
Chickasaw Nation categorical approach, the Court should find the tax is 
preempted by federal law using the interest balancing-test articulated in 
Bracker. 448 U.S. at 142–43. Under this test, the Court should weigh the 
tribal, federal and state interests and find New Dakota’s TPT preempted by 
federal law because the tax interferes with purposes underlying federal laws 
and programs. Id. Specifically, the TPT interferes with the Development’s 
ability to provide affordable housing and healthcare facilities in Indian 
Country, R. at 7–8, which are supported by comprehensive government 
programs, infra at 29–30.  
The TPT also infringes on tribal sovereignty as applied to the 
Development. The Court has consistently recognized the right of “Indians 
to make their own laws and be ruled by them” Williams, 358 U.S. at 220. 
Accordingly, unless Congress “expressly authorized state tax jurisdiction in 
Indian country,” that authority is presumed not to exist. Okla. Tax Comm'n 
v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 126, (1993). The state’s application of 
the tax would touch exclusively Indian entities by taxing a Wendat Band 
corporation operating on Indian lands. R. at 7–8. In addition, this tax would 
be on the entirety of the Development’s sales, rather than specific products. 
4 N.D.C § 212(1). The Court has never ruled that such a broad tax on tribal 
businesses in Indian Country is valid. A decision in favor of the petitioner 
would permit a state to dramatically expand its jurisdiction in Indian 
Country in violation of tribal sovereignty. The Court should avoid such a 
momentous decision infringing on tribal sovereignty and bar New Dakota’s 
application of the TPT in Indian Country. 
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I. The Topanga Cession Falls Within the Wendat Reservation Because the 
Maumee Reservation Was Diminished and the Maumee’s Claim to the 
Topanga Cession Abrogated 
Congress diminished the Maumee Reservation in two ways, both 
resulting in the Topanga Cession falling within the Wendat Reservation. 
First, Congress abrogated the Treaty of Wauseon with the Treaty with the 
Wendat. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). Second, 
Congress dually confirmed this abrogation when it passed the Maumee 
Allotment Act of 1908. Explicit language in the Act referring to cession 
indicates a clear congressional intent to diminish the Maumee’s lands in the 
Topanga Cession, as required under McGirt. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. 
Ct. 2452, 2462 (2020). Legislative history supports the contention that this 
was Congress’s intent. 42 Cong. Rec. 2345 (1908).  
The Maumee Allotment Act differs from the Wendat Allotment Act 
which had no such explicit language indicating congressional intent. 
Therefore, the Topanga Cession remains on the Wendat Reservation.  
A. The Treaty with the Wendat Abrogated the Treaty Of Wauseon, 
Diminishing the Maumee Reservation and Placing the Topanga Cession 
in Wendat Territory 
The 1859 Treaty with the Wendat reserved land in what is now the 
Topanga Cession to the Wendat Band, abrogating the Maumee Nation’s 
claim to the territory. In other instances of conflicting Indian treaties, 
Congress has either partitioned the land through mediation or by classifying 
the land as shared tribal land. See Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 575 F.2d 
239, 239–52 (9th Cir. 1978) (for an example of the partitioning of 
overlapping Indian reservations after an initial classification of shared 
land). However, because Congress took neither approach addressing the 
conflicting property claims between the Maumee and Wendat Band, the 
analysis should focus on congressional intent in the relevant treaties under 
McGirt v. Oklahoma. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2463.  
1. Congress Has the Power to Abrogate a Treaty by the Passage of a 
Law in Conflict with Said Treaty 
Congress may abrogate a treaty made with an Indian Nation by passing a 
law in conflict with the treaty. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566. The Constitution 
grants Congress plenary and exclusive powers to legislate in Indian affairs. 
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). The Indian Commerce 
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Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Treaty Clause, Art. II § 2, cl. 2, 
are the sources of that power. Id. This includes the exclusive authority to 
establish treaties with Indian nations, which “must be understood as grants 
of rights from Indian people who reserve all rights not granted.” Felix 
Cohen, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 6.03 (Nell Jessup 
Newton ed., 2017).  
 “Once a block of land is set aside for an Indian reservation and no 
matter what happens to the title of individual plots within the area, the 
entire block retains its reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates 
otherwise.” Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984). Relatedly, 
Congress has the exclusive power to diminish Indian reservations. McGirt, 
140 S. Ct. at 2462. However, while Congress may abrogate Indian treaties, 
“courts may not find that abrogation occurred absent clear evidence of 
congressional intent.” Cohen § 1.03.  
The most common methods of abrogation are through allotment, surplus, 
general land sales, or other legislation which may diminish an Indian 
reservation by restoring lands to the public domain. Ute Indian Tribe v. 
State, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1138 (D. Utah 1981). However, Congress may 
also diminish an Indian reservation by passing laws in conflict with 
previous treaties made with Indians. See, e.g. Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. 
Supp. at 1136 (where the Court held the Ute Indian Tribe’s Reservation was 
diminished by legislation withdrawing timber lands and establishing 
national forests). Essentially, as long as there is clear congressional intent, 
Congress has the power to abrogate treaties in myriad ways.  
2. A Plain Reading of the Treaty with the Wendat Shows Congress 
Unambiguously Intended to Abrogate the Maumee’s Claim to the 
Topanga Cession 
A plain reading of the Treaty with the Wendat shows congressional 
intent to displace the previous Treaty of Wauseon. This conclusion is 
bolstered by legislative history from the enactment.  
In McGirt, this Court outlined a simple analysis to determine whether a 
reservation is diminished. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2462. Under McGirt, the 
only place to look to determine whether a tribe continues to hold a 
reservation is to the Acts of Congress. Id. If Congress “wishes to break the 
promise of a reservation, it must say so.” Id.  
However, it is important to note when interpreting Indian treaties that 
interpretive analyses are not to be considered as “exercises in ordinary 
conveyancing.” Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630 (1970). 
Treaties were imposed on Indian Nations and as a consequence, the treaties 
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must be interpreted as the Indian Nations would have understood them. Id. 
at 631. Therefore, “any doubtful expressions in them should be resolved in 
the Indians’ favor.” Id.  
In the Treaty with the Wendat, the Wendat Band agreed to “cede to the 
United States their title and interest to lands in the New Dakota Territory, 
excepting those lands east of the Wapakoneta River.” Treaty with the 
Wendat, March 26, 1859, 35 Stat. 7749 (emphasis added). This shows that 
both Congress and the Band saw those lands as theirs to hold or cede and 
intended for the Wendat Band to retain these lands that now make up the 
Topanga Cession.  
It is unnecessary to review extra-contextual evidence given the text of 
the treaty is clear, see McGirt 140 S. Ct. at 2462, but this conclusion is 
underscored in the legislative history of the enactment of the Treaty, see 
Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5411–12 (1859). In speeches made 
during the debates regarding the ratification of the Treaty, senators noted 
that the Territory of New Dakota was “emptying of its Indian population,” 
with the Wendat Band being some of the last to yield their claims to the 
bulk of the Territory. Id. (“Beginning with the Maumee, the Indians of New 
Dakota have slowly yielded their claims to the bulk of the Territory”, and 
“few Indians now live along the Zion tributary and even fewer are to be 
found near the river Wapakoneta”).  
These discussions indicate that Congress did not think that the Maumee 
were inhabiting the area now called the Topanga Cession at the time the 
Treaty with the Wendat was made. Even if they were mistaken and 
Maumee were living in the area, congressional intent controls and indicates 
that the senators fully intended the Maumee Reservation to be abrogated 
and for the land to be reserved for the Wendat Band.  
a) The Role of the River Does Not Change the Plain Reading of the 
Treaties at Hand 
The fact of the river’s movement over time, R. at 5, may appear to 
complicate the analysis of the question, but it does not change the plain 
reading of the treaties.  
The treatment of rivers which fall within reservations in resolving 
property disputes among tribes and between tribes and states is also 
centered on congressional intent. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 652. In 
Choctaw, the Court held that Congress intended to and did convey title to 
the bed of the Arkansas River in the grants it made to petitioner tribes. Id. at 
654. It did this by noting that the documents were consistent with and 
confirmed the natural reading of the title. Id. There was no express 
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exclusion of the riverbed as there was no other land within the grants. Id. at 
634. Lower courts have applied a similar analysis in deciding disputes over 
rivers as tribal water resources. United States v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190, 190–98 
(9th Cir. 1989).  
Additionally, both parties agree water law does not weigh on the dispute 
at hand. R. at 5. Moreover, the Wapakoneta River’s role does not make a 
difference for two reasons: First, because the river moved before Congress 
made the Treaty with the Wendat, and second, the Wapakoneta River 
serves as a reservation boundary, not falling directly within either 
reservation. 
Accordingly, both the language in the Treaty and the legislative history 
surrounding the Treaty’s enactment show that Congress intended to 
abrogate the Maumee’s claim to the Topanga Cession.  
B. Even if the Treaty with the Wendat’s Intent Regarding Abrogation Is 
Ambiguous, the Maumee Allotment Act of 1908 Diminished the Maumee 
Reservation, Placing the Topanga Cession Within Wendat Territory by 
Default 
If the Court finds the Treaty with the Wendat did not diminish the 
Maumee Reservation, the Maumee Allotment Act of 1908 would have had 
the same effect. Maumee Allotment Act of 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-8107, ch. 
818. The Maumee Allotment Act diminished the entire eastern quarter of 
the Maumee Reservation, and no subsequent statute diminished the Wendat 
Reservation. R. at 8. Therefore, the surplus lands, including the Topanga 
Cession, revert to Wendat Band control.  
Congress passed the Maumee Allotment Act after enacting the General 
Allotment Act in 1887, which authorized the allotment of reservation lands. 
Id. at 13–14. As demonstrated by the Maumee Allotment Act, actual 
allotment was accomplished through specific legislation that implemented 
or sometimes replaced the general Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 424; see also Felix 
Cohen, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 1.04 (Nell Jessup 
Newton ed., 2017) (discussing General Allotment Act of 1887).  
The effect of any given surplus land act depends on the language of the 
act and the circumstances underlying its passage. Solem, 465 U.S. at 469. 
Some allotment acts diminish a reservation, while others allow non-Indians 
to buy land within a reservation’s boundaries. Id. at 468. In order to 
diminish a reservation, Congress must clearly evince “an intent to change 
boundaries.” Id. at 470. 
McGirt has set the standard for analyzing whether there was 
diminishment under an allotment act, notably by focusing on the analysis of 
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congressional intent in the language of the act itself and not consulting 
extratextual sources unless the meaning of an act is unclear. McGirt, 140 S. 
Ct. at 2469. However, although extratextual evidence cannot override clear 
congressional intent under McGirt, it can help shed light on the intended 
meaning of the text in question at the time of enactment. Id. McGirt 
considers the factors outlined in Solem as a way to clear up ambiguity in 
statutory language. Id. at 2468.  
Solem presents a three-prong analysis for determining whether a surplus 
land act diminished a reservation. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470. The first step of 
the Solem test is to consider the language of the act, and whether it 
explicitly references cession. Id. If the reference to cession is coupled by an 
unconditional commitment to compensate the tribe for opened land, there is 
an “almost insurmountable” presumption that Congress meant for the 
tribe’s reservation to be diminished. Id. Second, congressional intent may 
be inferred from events surrounding the passage of a surplus land act, 
particularly the manner in which the transaction was negotiated and the 
reports presented to Congress. Id. at 471. Lastly, events after the passage of 
the surplus land act may be used as evidence towards intent. Id. This can 
include Congress’s treatment of the affected area, how the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs dealt with unallotted open lands, and whether a flood of non-Indian 
settlers can demonstrate “de facto” diminishment. Id.  
A handful of federal cases provide examples of how the Court reviews 
whether an allotment act diminished a reservation. In Rosebud Sioux Tribe 
v. Kneip, the Court held that language and legislative history of three 
congressional acts showed a definite intent to diminish the boundaries of 
the Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 
430 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (the Indians “belonging on the Rosebud 
Reservation, South Dakota, for the consideration hereinafter named, do 
hereby cede, surrender, grant and convey to the United States” claim to the 
part of the Rosebud Reservation now remaining unallotted) (emphasis 
added). The use of the word “cession” clarifies the intended meaning 
between the “diminution of the Reservation boundaries on the one hand, 
and merely opening up designated lands for settlement by non-Indians, on 
the other.” Id. at 597.  
Similarly, in DeCoteau v. District County Court for Tenth Judicial Dist., 
the Court held that the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation in South Dakota 
was terminated by an 1891 Act on the “face of the Act,” “surrounding 
circumstances” and “legislative history.” DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Ct. for 
Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975). Specifically, the Act says 
that the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Dakota or Sioux Indians “hereby 
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cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States” their claims and 
interest to all the unallotted lands within the Reservation. Id. at 436 
(emphasis added); see also South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. 329 
(1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); Wyoming v. EPA, 875 F.3d 
505 (10th Cir. 2017) (all holding that Congress diminished reservations 
citing a similar language analysis).  
The Maumee Allotment Act stipulates that “Unclaimed lands in the 
western three-quarters of the reservations shall continue to be reserved to 
the Maumee,” while the “Indians have agreed to consider the entire eastern 
quarter surplus and to cede their interest in the surplus lands to the United 
States where it may be returned the public domain by way of this act” [sic], 
Maumee Allotment Act of 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-8107, ch. 818 (emphasis 
added). These lands would include those in the Topanga Cession. This is a 
direct mirroring of the cession language used in Rosebud Sioux and 
DeCoteau. Rosebud Sioux Tribe 430 U.S. at 597; DeCoteau., 420 U.S. at 
445. On its face, the Act passes the McGirt analysis. There is nothing 
ambiguous about the cession language therein.  
Petitioner may argue that because the Maumee Allotment Act does not 
include an unconditional commitment to compensate the tribe for the 
opened land, then it does not evidence intent to diminish, despite the 
cession language. Maumee Allotment Act of 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-8107, 
ch. 818. However, this argument would be misguided. While the Act does 
not specify an unconditional monetary amount to be paid to the Maumee, it 
does provide that the price of lands actually sold shall be deposited with the 
U.S. treasury to the credit of the Indians. Id., section 4. While this may 
seem as though the Act is open-ended, Section 1 of the Act notes that the 
Secretary of the Interior is authorized by the Act to survey the entire 
Maumee Reservation. Id., section 1. This indicates that at the time of the 
enactment, the surveying had not yet been completed, so it would be 
reasonable to deduce that a price had simply not been agreed upon, and the 
land sale deal had not yet been closed. Thus, the lack of an unconditional 
commitment to compensate the tribe for opened land is not evidence that 
congress did not intend to diminish the Maumee Reservation.  
The Maumee Allotment Act, viewed through the analysis outlined by 
Solem and McGirt, was certainly intended to diminish the Maumee 
Reservation. The language of the Act supports the conclusion that Congress 
intended to diminish the Maumee Reservation. Maumee Allotment Act of 
1908, Pub. L. No. 60-8107, ch. 818. The legislative history also supports 
this contention. Given that the Treaty with the Wendat established Wendat 
Band authority over that land, by default the Topanga Cession would revert 
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back to Wendat Band control after 1908, a point that will be examined in 
Part II, infra.  
1. If the Court Deems the Payment Structure in Section 4 of the Maumee 
Allotment Act Ambiguous, the Extratextual Evidence Indicates the 
Maumee Reservation Was Diminished 
Even if the Court finds the payment arrangement in Section 4 
ambiguous, the extratextual evidence can be used to clarify that Congress 
diminished the Maumee Reservation. Supra 14.  
The legislative history from the enactment of the Maumee Allotment Act 
supports the conclusion above. See 42 Cong. Rec. 2345 (1908). In 
discussing the Act, the congressmen discussed the price per acre and point 
out that the surveys have not yet been completed. Id. While they expressed 
trepidation that until there is payment the land belongs to the Maumee, one 
congressman indicated that in no event shall any land be disposed of at less 
than $5 an acre, even pending survey. Id. These words can have no other 
meaning than to express an intent to diminish the Reservation, as soon as 
the surveying was completed.  
Additionally, events after the enactment of the Act provide further 
evidence that diminishment took place. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has 
lost or spoilt the records which show exactly which parcels of the Topanga 
Cession the Maumee Tribe was compensated for after the Allotment Act. R. 
at 7. However, a demographic analysis of U.S. Census records taken since 
1880 in Door Prairie County shows that from 1910 to 1920, the percentage 
of American Indian inhabitants of the Topanga Cession dropped from 
80.4% to 20.3% during that timeframe, supporting the conclusion that the 
intended effects of the act took place. R. at 7. As a whole, the legislative 
history and subsequent demographic analysis clearly indicate congress 
executed allotment after the enactment of the Act. The lack of 
unconditional payment was not a roadblock to the Act’s ultimate goal of 
diminishing the Reservation.  
2. The Reservation of Lands for Schools in the Maumee Allotment Act Is 
Definitive Textual Evidence of Congressional Intent to Diminish the 
Maumee Reservation 
Due to the unique treatment of schools in federal legislation during this 
time, the notation in the Maumee Allotment Act that certain tracts of 
opened land will be reserved for schools is definitive evidence of 
diminishment of the Maumee Reservation.  
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In Rosebud Sioux, the Court found evidence of intent in the act’s 
references to reserving land for common schools. Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. 
at 601. Under the law admitting North and South Dakota as states into the 
Union, townships would only be eligible for federal grants to establish 
schools in areas where reservations were extinguished. Id.  
Similarly, the Maumee Allotment Act reserves section sixteen and thirty-
six of the land in each township for the use of common schools, paid for by 
the United States at $5.50 per acre. Maumee Allotment Act of 1908, Pub. L. 
No. 60-8107, ch. 818. It would be reasonable to conclude that federal 
guidelines would require New Dakota be subject to similar laws as in 
Rosebud Sioux. Id. at 599. Parallel to the Court’s holding in Rosebud Sioux, 
the school stipulation in the Act clearly indicate that Congress intended the 
Reservation to be dissolved in those townships.  
II. The Topanga Cessions Remains Within the Wendat Reservation Because 
This Territory Was Not Ceded in the Wendat Allotment Act 
The Wendat Allotment Act of 1892 did not diminish the Wendat 
Reservation. Instead, in contrast to the Maumee Allotment Act, the Wendat 
Allotment Act merely opened the way for non-Indian settlers to own land 
on the Wendat Reservation. Wendat Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 52-8222, 
ch. 42 (1892).  
The key distinction between the Wendat Allotment Act and the Maumee 
Allotment Act is that the Wendat Act did not automatically cede lands to be 
surveyed for potential sales. Id. The Wendat Act also allowed tribe 
members to choose their allotments from the western portion of the 
Reservation. See id. section 1. Therefore, based on similar analysis used in 
Section I, supra 13–16, the Wendat Band retained control over the Topanga 
Cession despite the Allotment Act of 1892.  
Regardless of whether non-Indian settlers inhabited the Topanga Cession 
or if it was treated as a continuous, allotted segment of the Wendat 
Reservation, the Topanga Cession still falls within Indian Country on the 
Wendat Reservation. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464. 
A. The Language of the Wendat Allotment Act Shows That Congress Did 
Not Intend to Diminish the Wendat Reservation 
The Wendat Allotment Act lacks any language referencing cession, 
showing that Congress did not intend to diminish the Wendat Reservation.  
The analysis for diminishment here mirrors that set out by Solem and 
McGirt, above. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2469; Solem, 465 U.S. at 470. An 
allotment act does not automatically diminish a reservation; there must be 
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language and strong evidence to show that it does before the land is 
considered diminished. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464. When there is no 
equivalent law terminating what remained, a reservation can be said to 
survive allotment. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464–65 (“Congress may have 
passed allotment laws to create the conditions for disestablishment. But to 
equate allotment with disestablishment would confuse the first step of a 
march with arrival at its destination.”). 
For instance, in Nebraska v. Parker, the Court held that Congress did not 
intend to diminish a reservation via an allotment act using the Solem factors 
to guide this analysis. Nebraska v Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1078 (2016). 
The Court found that the 1882 Act in Parker empowered the government to 
survey and appraise lands which could be purchased in tracts by non-
members of the tribe. Id. The Act did not mention cession or restoring parts 
of a reservation to the public domain – it simply stated that the disputed 
lands would be “open for settlement under such rules and regulations as the 
[Secretary of the Interior] may prescribe.” Id. at 1077. Thus, while the Act 
allowed non-Indian settlers to own land on the Reservation, it did not 
diminish the Reservation’s boundaries. Wendat Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 
52-8222, ch. 42 (1892). 
Similarly, in United States v. Jackson, the court found that the language 
of the 1905 Act in question only extended an existing right-of-way law and 
did not diminish the Reservation. United States v. Jackson, 853 F.3d 436 at 
446 (8th Cir. 2017). The language surrounding payment in the Act, despite 
seeming to be unconditional, was explained by evidence showing that this 
method of compensation indicated Congress intended to compensate tribal 
members for an expansion of the railroad’s right-of-way. See also United 
States v. Webb, 219 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); Seymour v. Superintendent 
of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 359 (1962); Murphy v. Royal, 
875 F.3d 896, 938 (10th Cir. 2017).  
This case is parallel to Parker. The Wendat Allotment Act authorizes the 
Indian Agent at Fort Crosby to “formally continue surveying the western 
half of the lands reserved by the Wendat Band in the 1859 Treaty,” after 
which each adult Indian would have one year to select an allotment for 
themselves or a child. Wendat Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 52-8222, ch. 42 
(1892). The Act notes that “All lands not selected within one year of the 
survey’s completion shall be declared surplus lands and open to 
settlement,” while the eastern half of the Wendat Reservation “shall 
continue to be held in trust by the United States for the use and benefit of 
the Band.” Id. As in Parker, 136 at 1077, the act empowered the 
government to survey the land in the western part of the Wendat 
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Reservation, with the intention that some of that land would be sold, but 
made no mention of restoring parts of the Reservation to the public domain, 
id.  
In addition, the Wendat Allotment Act does not include any language of 
cession, unlike the Maumee Allotment Act (“Indians have agreed to 
consider the entire eastern quarter surplus and to cede their interest in 
surplus lands”), and more closely follows the language of the acts in 
Murphy v. Royal and United States v. Jackson. See Wendat Allotment Act, 
Pub. L. No. 52-8222, ch. 42 (1892); Murphy 875 F.3d at 938; Jackson, 853 
F.3d at 446. This distinction is key, as the lack of cession language, or 
references to restoring parts of the Reservation to public domain puts the 
Wendat Act squarely within the category of allotment acts which simply 
open Indian reservations to non-Indian settlers. See Parker, 136 at 1077.  
In conclusion, the Wendat Allotment Act does not include cession 
language sufficient to diminish the Wendat Reservation. Wendat Allotment 
Act, Pub. L. No. 52-8222, ch. 42 (1892). Despite there being no express 
language confirming “reservation” status, there is no intent in the Act to 
show that the ownership status of the land will change in any way, and 
there is no equivalent law terminating what remained. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 
2464. 
1. The Language Regarding Payments in the Wendat Allotment Act Is 
Not Unconditional, and Is Therefore Confirmatory of the Congressional 
Intent to Preserve the Wendat Reservation 
The petitioner may argue that the payment arrangement in Section 2 of 
the Wendat Allotment Act signals Congress intended the act to diminish the 
Wendat Reservation, but this ignores the alternative reasons for including 
the payment arrangements.  
Under Solem, an unconditional promise of payment could indicate that 
Congress did intend to diminish the Reservation. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470. 
However, this case is distinct from Solem because the payments in the 
Wendat Allotment Act are not unconditional. Wendat Allotment Act, Pub. 
L. No. 52-8222, ch. 42 (1892).  
Section 2 of the Wendat Allotment Act says that the United States will 
pay the Wendat $3.40 for every acre declared surplus, and capping that 
payment to no more than $2.2 million. Id. Thus, the act conditioned this 
payment on surplus lands being found, which would imply that this would 
happen after the surveying and allotment to the tribe members. Id. at sec. 1. 
This conditional payment distinguishes this case from the scenario outlined 
in Solem and does not show an intent to diminish the Wendat Reservation.  
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2. The Subsequent Demographics of the Topanga Cession Provide 
Further Evidence That the Wendat Allotment Act Simply Opened Parts of 
the Wendat Reservation to Non-Indian Settlers 
The drop in the Indian population in the Topanga Cession, which may be 
cited by petitioner as evidence that the Wendat Reservation was 
diminished, is irrelevant when considering diminishment. R. at 7. Even if 
the Court deemed the Wendat Allotment Act language ambiguous and in 
need of clarification, the decrease in the Wendat Band population in the 
Topanga Cession after the Wendat Allotment Act is consistent with the 
conclusion that the area was opened to non-member settlers, but remained 
part of the Wendat Reservation. Id.  
In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, the Oneida tribe had 
previously relinquished governmental interest in the property, and the Court 
held that the tribe was unable to regain sovereignty through open-market 
purchase of the property. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 
197, 214 (2005). Key to the Court’s holding was determining that the 
character of the area and its inhabitants was distinctly non-Indian so 
granting tribal sovereignty would not be equitable. Id. This evidence was 
coupled with a long history of state sovereign control over the property. Id. 
Here, unlike Oneida, there is no evidence that the Wendat Band ever 
relinquished control of the Topanga Cession and are trying to regain 
sovereignty through buying property. R at 7–8. The Wendat Band has 
continuously considered the Topanga Cession to be part of its Reservation. 
See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468.  
Any extratextual evidence, whether demographic or otherwise, is 
irrelevant because it cannot be found to override the language of the Act. 
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468. Extratextual considerations do not supply a 
“blank check” in overruling congressional intent. Id. at 2469. However, 
even if in consulting the extratextual evidence, the Court should find that, 
unlike the Maumee Allotment Act, the Wendat Act did not diminish the 
Reservation.  
B. The Fact That the Development in the Topanga Cession Was 
Purchased from Non-Indian Owners Has No Impact on the Conclusion 
That It Is in Indian Country on the Wendat Reservation 
The land purchased in the Topanga Cession for the development at 
question is still considered Indian Country despite being purchased from 
non-Indian owners. Congress defines Indian Country to include all land 
within the limits of any Indian reservation, including private land 
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ownership within reservation boundaries, regardless of member status of 
the owner. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (defining “Indian country”); Solem, 465 
U.S. at 468 (“Only in 1948 did Congress uncouple reservation status from 
Indian ownership, and statutorily define Indian country to include lands 
held in fee by non-Indians within the reservation boundaries”).  
Therefore, although both tribes agree that no member of either tribe 
selected an allotment within the Topanga Cession, this has no weight on the 
fact that the Development is within Indian Country. Allotment and 
preservation of reservation status are not mutually exclusive, and the 
Topanga Cession, including land purchased from non-Indian owners, 
should be considered as a part of the Wendat Reservation. 
III. The Doctrines of Indian Preemption and Infringement Bar New 
Dakota’s Transaction Privilege Tax from Applying to the Wendat Band 
Development 
Since 1832, the Court has consistently held that state law is generally not 
applicable within Indian Country. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 
561–62 (1832); see also Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945) (stating 
that the “policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is 
deeply rooted in the Nation’s history”). Specifically, two barriers limit the 
applicability of state laws in Indian Country: the doctrines of Indian 
preemption and infringement. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 
448 U.S. 136, 142–43 (1980).  
Either doctrine sufficiently bars New Dakota’s Transaction Privilege Tax 
from applying to the Development.  
A. The Doctrine of Indian Preemption Prevents the State of New Dakota 
from Applying Its Transaction Privilege Tax to Tribes and Tribal 
Corporations in Indian Country Under Chickasaw Nation or Bracker 
New Dakota’s TPT is barred from applying to the Development because 
it is preempted by federal law.  
Given the unique history of tribal governments, the analysis of federal 
preemption of state laws in Indian Country is distinct from preemption 
analysis in other areas of law. See e.g. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143 (“The 
unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to 
apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards of 
preemption that have emerged in other areas of the law.”). When 
considering taxation in Indian Country, the presumption is that state law 
does not apply unless there is sufficient evidence of congressional intent to 
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the contrary. Felix Cohen, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 6.03 
(Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2017).  
Critical in framing this unique analysis is determining who bears the 
challenged tax and where the taxation occurs. Wagnon v. Prairie Band 
Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 101 (2005). When the legal incidence of a 
tax in Indian Country falls on a tribe or tribal members, states are 
categorically barred from applying the tax without congressional 
authorization. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 459 
(1995). When the legal incidence of the tax falls on a non-Indian within 
Indian Country, the Court has applied an interest-balancing test considering 
the particular tribal, federal and state interests at stake (hereinafter the 
“Bracker test”). Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145; see also Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 
110–11 (collecting cases that apply the Bracker test). Under this balancing 
test, federal law preempts the state tax if the tax interferes with purposes 
underlying federal laws and programs for Indians. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 
151; see also Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 
165–66 (1980); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 
U.S. 685, 690–91 (1965). 
Because New Dakota’s TPT falls on the Tribe within Indian Country, the 
tax is preempted under Chickasaw Nation. 515 U.S. at 459.However, even 
if the Court finds the tax is not categorically barred, the tax is preempted 
under the Bracker test. 448 U.S. at 151. 
1. Chickasaw Nation’s Categorical Approach to Preemption Prevents 
New Dakota from Applying the TPT to the Development as an Indian 
Business Operating in Indian Country 
Chickasaw Nation bars New Dakota from applying its Transaction 
Privilege Tax to the Development. 515 U.S. at 459.  
In Chickasaw Nation, the Court barred the application of a state motor 
fuels tax to a tribe’s retail store located in Indian Country. Id. The Court 
held that if the “legal incidence of an excise tax rests on a tribe or on tribal 
members for sales made inside Indian country, the tax cannot be enforced 
absent clear congressional authorization.” Id. Who bears the legal incidence 
of the tax can be found by looking at the language of the tax statute. See 
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458; see also Moe v. Confederated Salish & 
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 482 (1976). The I.R.S. has held that a tribal 
corporation has “the same tax status as the Indian tribe,” Rev. Rul. 81-295, 
1981-2 C.B. 15, so the same analysis that would apply to the Wendat Band 
applies to the Development.  
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New Dakota requires businesses to obtain a license to do business in the 
state, 4 N.D.C § 212(1), and “every licensee is obligated to the state 3% of 
their gross proceeds or gross income to the state,” Id. at § 212(2) (emphasis 
added). The statute’s requirement that a business remit “their” proceeds 
clearly indicates the tax falls on the tribal corporation.  
The petitioner may contend that the legal incidence falls on consumers 
rather than the tribal corporation, but this argument is not supported by the 
text of the statute nor the facts of Chickasaw Nation. Id. In Chickasaw 
Nation, the legal incidence of the tax fell on the Indian retailer despite the 
distributor actually remitting the tax. Id. However, the Court noted that 
“crucially, the statute describes this remittal by the distributor as “on behalf 
of a licensed retailer.” Id. (quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 505(C)). Nothing in 
New Dakota’s statute requires the funds to be passed onto consumers or 
notes that the funds are remitted on behalf of consumers. 4 N.D.C § 212. 
Rather, the tribal business must remit “their gross proceeds” to the state. 4 
N.D.C § 212(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute clearly indicates the 
legal incidence of the tax would fall on the Wendat tribal corporation. Id.  
Because the legal incidence would fall on a business entirely owned by a 
tribe, and the Development is located within Indian Country, R. at 3, the tax 
is categorically barred under the doctrine of Indian preemption articulated 
in Chickasaw Nation. 515 U.S. at 461.  
a) Under Chickasaw Nation, the Tax Is Barred from Applying to the 
Development in Indian Country Even if the Development Is Located 
Outside of the Wendat Band Reservation 
The tax would still be barred under the doctrine of Indian preemption 
articulated in Chickasaw Nation even if the Court finds the Development is 
located in Indian Country, but outside of the Wendat Reservation. 515 U.S. 
at 450.  
In considering federal preemption of taxes in Indian Country, the Court 
has consistently differentiated between Indian and non-Indian groups, 
rather than members of a reservation and nonmembers. See e.g., id. (noting 
that a state tax is barred when falling on “a tribe or on tribal members for 
sales made inside Indian country”) (emphasis added); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 
144 (“When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state 
law is generally inapplicable…”) (emphasis added); Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 
110–13. In each case, the Court finds the relevant distinction in its 
preemption analysis to be between Indians and non-Indians rather than 
tribal members and non-members. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 450; 
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143; Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 110–13. 
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New Dakota’s statute exempts tribes from collecting taxes for a tribe’s 
operations within their own reservations on land held in trust by the United 
States, 4 N.D.C. § 212(4), but fails to draw the necessary distinction 
between Indians and non-Indians operating in Indian Country, Chickasaw 
Nation, 515 U.S. at 450. The statute would therefore require a tribe 
operating on tribal lands to remit funds to the state despite the activities 
solely Indian persons or entities. Such a tax is an unlawful exercise of New 
Dakota’s power over tribal affairs, over which the Constitution grants the 
federal government “exclusive authority.” Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of 
Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985). 
Thus, the state should be barred from applying the TPT to the 
Development by the doctrine of Indian preemption this Court articulated in 
Chickasaw Nation. 515 U.S. at 450. 
2. If Chickasaw Nation Did Not Apply, the Transaction Privilege Tax 
Would Still Be Barred Under the Bracker Test Because the Tax Would 
Negatively Impact Federal and Tribal Interests 
If the Court finds that Chickasaw Nation does not apply, the TPT would 
still be barred under Bracker because the tax’s negative effects on federal 
and tribal interests outweigh the state’s general interests in raising revenue 
and supporting commercial development.  
An assertion of state authority in Indian Country must be viewed against 
any interference with the successful accomplishment of the purposes of 
federal programs. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 
335–36 (1983). Because federal preemption “is not limited to cases in 
which Congress has expressly preempted the state tax,” Flandreau Santee 
Sioux Tribe v. Noem, 938 F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2019), determining the 
purposes behind federal programs is necessary in this analysis, Cotton 
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989).  
In Bracker, this Court found that a state tax was barred under the 
doctrine of Indian preemption because even though the tax fell on a non-
Indian logging company, the cost ultimately fell on the tribe and the tax 
undermined Congress’s intent to ensure the benefits from the timber 
operations would encourage self-government. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 149–51 
(finding that “the taxes would threaten the overriding federal objective of 
guaranteeing Indians that they will “receive...the benefit of whatever profit 
[the forest] is capable of yielding....” (quoting 25 CFR § 141.3(a)(3)). In 
Ramah, this Court found that federal law preempted a state tax on gross 
receipts a non-Indian construction company received from a tribal school 
board given the extensive federal oversight and interests in promoting tribal 
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school financing. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of 
N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 841–43 (1982) (finding that the burden from the taxes 
“impedes the clearly expressed federal interest in promoting the quality and 
quantity of educational opportunities for Indians by depleting the funds 
available for the construction of Indian schools”) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
In both Bracker and Ramah, the Court focused on the purposes behind 
federal programs, the comprehensiveness of the programs, and how the 
state tax would interfere with the programs’ purposes. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 
841; Bracker, 448 U.S. at 149. 
New Dakota’s TPT would similarly interfere with the purposes of federal 
programs supporting Indian housing and healthcare by diverting proceeds 
necessary to support these programs to purposes determined by the state. R. 
at 7–8. The tax’s interference with federal priorities is directly analogous to 
the taxes barred in Bracker and Ramah. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 149; Ramah, 
458 U.S. at 841. 
The Development would support 350 jobs, provide nursing services, a 
bookstore, a pharmacy, a grocery store, and affordable housing. R. at 7–8. 
As with many large development projects, the provision of these services is 
interconnected. For instance, the Record notes that the affordable housing 
units and nursing facilities could not be constructed without revenue from 
the sales that the state hopes to tax. Id. 
Focusing on the Development’s housing and healthcare services 
demonstrates how the tax interferes with federal schemes relating to Native 
Americans. 
The federal government has established comprehensive schemes 
supporting affordable housing in tribal communities. U.S. Gen. Accounting 
Office, GAO/RCED-99-16, Native American Housing: Information on 
HUD’s Funding of Indian Housing Programs, 20–31 (1998). The purpose 
of these programs is clear from the text of the Native American Housing 
Assistance and Self-Determination Act (1996), which notes the “special 
role of the United States in helping tribes and their members to improve 
their housing conditions and socioeconomic status.” 25 U.S.C. § 4101(5). 
Federal housing programs for Indians are also meant to increase the 
“availability of private financing in Indian country” and support 
partnerships among federal and tribal governments to promote housing. 
Felix Cohen, Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 22.05 (Nell 
Jessup Newton ed., 2017); see also 25 U.S.C. 4101(1)(C).  
Federal programs promoting Indian healthcare are similarly 
comprehensive. The Indian Health Care Improvement Act (“IHCIA”) notes 
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that a “major national goal of the United States is to provide the resources, 
processes, and structure that will enable Indian tribes and tribal members to 
obtain the quantity and quality of health care services and opportunities that 
will eradicate the health disparities between Indians and the general 
population of the United States.” 25 U.S.C. § 1601. The Act broadened 
Indian healthcare to include hospice, assisted living and long-term care. 
Elayne J. Heisler, Cong. Research Serv., R41630, The Indian Health Care 
Improvement Act Reauthorization and Extension as Enacted by the ACA: 
Detailed Summary and Timeline (2011). 
These federal laws evince clear purposes and priorities in promoting 
housing and access to healthcare in Indian communities that would be 
disrupted by the TPT. The development would provide services to support 
Native American healthcare, most clearly through the nursing care 
facilities, but also through the pharmacy and grocery store, which would 
help prevent the area from becoming a food desert. R. at 7–8. The use of 
proceeds from the Development and federal programs are steps to close the 
significant disparities in Native American access to adequate housing and 
healthcare. R. at 8; Nancy Pindus, et al., U.S. Dep’t of Hous., Housing 
Needs of American Indians and Alaska Natives in Tribal Areas: A Report 
From the Assessment of American Indian, Alaska Native, and Native 
Hawaiian Housing Needs 63–65 (2017); U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, 
Broken Promises: Continuing Federal Funding Shortfall for Native 
Americans 61, 66 (2018). The TPT would dilute the private, tribal funding 
that would otherwise be available to support Indian housing and nursing 
care. R. at 8. 
Because the state’s application of the TPT would negatively interfere 
with federal and tribal interests in providing affordable housing and 
healthcare services in Indian Country, only exceedingly strong state 
interests would justify the tax under the Bracker test.  
a) The State’s Interests in Applying the TPT in Indian Country Are 
Minimal Relative to the Tax’s Negative Impact on Federal and Tribal 
Interests 
The state’s interest in raising revenue for its general revenue fund, R. at 
6, does not justify the imposition of the tax on the Development.  
In considering federal preemption of taxes applied in Indian Country 
under the Bracker test, there is a distinction between taxes whose purpose is 
to raise revenue and taxes that serve some other regulatory interest. See 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 
U.S. 134, 155 (1980). In Bracker, the Court noted that where the state is 
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“unable to justify the taxes except in terms of a generalized interest in 
raising revenue, we believe that the proposed exercise of state authority is 
impermissible.” 448 U.S. at 151.  
The interests served by New Dakota’s TPT are too general to permit the 
tax’s interference with federal and tribal interests. The proceeds from the 
tax “are paid into the state’s general revenue fund for the purpose of 
maintaining a viable and robust commercial market within the state.” 4 
N.D.C. § 212 (3). Such a generalized purpose would fail to ensure a 
substitute source of funding for the federal and tribal interests negatively 
impacted by the tax.  
In addition, unlike the taxation scheme in the Court’s cigarette taxation 
cases, see Washington, 447 U.S. at 141–42; Moe, 425 U.S. at 481–82, there 
is no indication that applying this tax would serve a similar purpose of 
preventing non-Indians from evading the state’s tax. In Washington, this 
Court did not bar the tax in those cases in part because the exemption was 
advertised to non-Indians who would normally do their business elsewhere, 
interfering with the state scheme to tax cigarettes in its jurisdiction. 
Washington, 447 U.S. at 155. The tax here serves no such regulatory 
purpose. The state would impose the tax directly on a tribal development 
that includes a grocery store which would help prevent the area from 
becoming a food desert, a bookstore and a pharmacy. R. at 8. The tax would 
not prevent non-Indians from evading a tax because the tax applies to the 
business itself rather than to customers. Instead, the tax would reduce 
proceeds for Indian projects relating to housing and healthcare and reduce 
profits to Indian owners of the project.  
Accordingly, the state’s interests are not sufficiently strong to justify the 
imposition of the TPT in tribal country and the tax is therefore preempted 
by federal law under the Bracker test. 448 U.S. at 151.  
b) The Tax Still Interferes with Federal and Tribal Interests Even if the 
State Remits the Proceeds to Tribal Governments 
The petitioner may argue that because the state would remit the proceeds 
from the TPT to tribes when the tax is imposed on reservations, 4 N.D.C. § 
212(5), the tax does not interfere with federal or tribal interests.  
This argument fails because the tax would still infringe on the federal 
government’s interest in encouraging tribal sovereignty by promoting tribal 
self-government and self-sufficiency. See New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 334–35 
(noting that “both the tribes and the Federal Government are firmly 
committed to the goal of promoting tribal self-government, a goal 
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embodied in numerous federal statutes.”); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143 (noting 
“a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency.”). 
If the state were to collect taxes within the Maumee Tribe’s jurisdiction 
in Indian Country and remit these taxes back to the tribe, the state 
effectively takes over the Maumee’s taxation function. This discourages 
self-government by disincentivizing the Maumee Tribe from establishing its 
own revenue collection scheme. In addition, it interferes with the economic 
self-sufficiency of both the Wendat Band and Maumee Tribe. The Wendat 
Band would earn less income, increasing the likelihood of reliance on other 
funds, and the Maumee Tribe receiving the proceeds may become reliant on 
state proceeds, displacing funds earned from the tribe’s own activities. 
Consequently, the goal of promoting economic self-sufficiency of both 
tribes are discouraged by the state’s tax.  
Thus, the statute requiring remission of proceeds a tribe when earned on 
a tribe’s reservation does not prevent the tax from being preempted under 
the Bracker test.  
B. The Transaction Privilege Tax Is Barred by the Doctrine of Tribal 
Sovereignty Because the State Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Impose the 
Tax in Indian Country on an Indian Corporation 
The doctrine of infringement bars New Dakota from levying its TPT 
because the tax infringes on the right of tribes to make their own laws in 
Indian Country. The doctrine of infringement is related to Indian 
preemption because the federal interest in promoting sovereignty informs 
the preemption analysis. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. 458 U.S. at 838. 
However, the doctrine is distinct and focuses on the right of “Indians to 
make their own laws and be ruled by them” rather than federal priorities. 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 
Since Worcester v. Georgia, the Court has recognized the sovereignty of 
tribal governments, with “distinct political communities, having territorial 
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive.” 31 U.S. at 557. The 
Indian sovereignty doctrine does not definitively bar state taxes or 
regulations, but it does provide “a backdrop against which the applicable 
treaties and federal statutes must be read.” McClanahan v. State Tax 
Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172, (1973).  
Accordingly, unless Congress “expressly authorized state tax jurisdiction 
in Indian country,” that authority is presumed not to exist. Okla. Tax 
Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 126, (1993); see also Blackfeet 
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. at 764. The Court has recognized that this 
presumption applies to a broad conception of “Indian country.” Id. at 115.  
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Despite the sovereignty doctrine seemingly disallowing state jurisdiction 
in Indian Country absent express congressional authority, Fox Nation, 508 
U.S. at 126, the Court has authorized state taxation on non-Indian 
companies relating to taxes on specific products or activities. Washington, 
447 U.S. at 141–42 (reviewing tax on cigarettes); Cotton Petroleum Corp. 
490 U.S. at 177 (reviewing tax on oil and gas); Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. 
Blaze Const. Co., 526 U.S. 32, 37 (1999) (reviewing tax on federal 
construction contracts).  
However, the TPT would apply to an entire Indian development 
providing groceries, books and pharmaceuticals to finance state priorities. 
R. at 8. This Court has never permitted such a broad application of state 
taxes that would affect the sale of a range of essential products such as 
those at issue. Allowing such a broad tax on the Development’s activities 
would allow the state to impose higher costs across a range of products, 
including groceries, books and pharmaceuticals to finance state priorities. 
R. at 8.  
The state cites efficiency as a reason to require businesses operating 
within a reservation to remit funds to the state. 4 N.D.C. § 212(5). 
However, efficiency cannot outweigh the protection of tribal sovereignty, 
given the “policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control 
is deeply rooted in the Nation's history.” Rice, 324 U.S. at 789. 
The consideration of whether the tax violates tribal sovereignty and 
federal authority over Indian affairs is even clearer when considering that 
the state’s application of the tax would touch exclusively Indian entities. A 
decision in favor of the petitioner would permit a state to dramatically 
expand its jurisdiction to cover almost any business activity occurring 
within Indian Country even when Indian entities are the sole parties in a 
transaction. The Court should avoid such a momentous violation of tribal 
sovereignty.  
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit. The Court should 
hold that (1) the disputed territory in the Topanga Cession belongs to the 
Wendat Band, and (2) New Dakota is barred from applying the TPT to the 
Development under the doctrines of Indian preemption and infringement. 
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